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A Global Water Apartheid: From
Revelation to Resolution
Itzchak Kornfeld*
ABSTRACT

It is well settled in internationalhuman rights law that a
human right to water exists. Nevertheless, to date, there has
been little scholarship about what the practical contours of the
right should be. If legal tools are to benefit the world's poor and
disenfranchised, they cannot be void due to the impossibility of
implementation. This is the problem with the purported human
right to water: it is quixotic.
This Article proposes a pragmatic solution to the potable
water problem for the world's poor. The solution offered here is
based on a model of privatized access to water grounded in a
microfinancing paradigm that is in turn founded on a loan
program incorporatedinto the New Deal's Rural Electrification
Act. The proposed paradigm therefore sidesteps the rightsbased scheme by resting upon a more concrete foundation based
on measurable results (i.e., the number of the world's 2.2 billion
people who lack potable water that will obtain access to water
versus the number that will not).
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"[W]hoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he
destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is
considered as if he saved an entire world."'

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Professor Stephen McCaffrey authored a seminal article
proposing a human right to water. 2 Since then, his efforts have

1.
Author).

2.

BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 4:8 (37A) (English translation provided by

Stephen

C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and

InternationalImplications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1992).
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fostered a stream of scholarship affirming his proposed entitlement.3
Today, the existence of a human right to water is seldom challenged,
and it now appears to be well rooted in international human rights
law. 4 Nevertheless, to date, there has been little scholarship about
what the practical contours of that entitlement should be.
Furthermore, those international lawyers who promote the right
to water generally ground their argument in the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.5 However, only
66 of the world's 199 countries are signatories to the treaty.6
Furthermore, even where the Convention has been ratified and found
to be justiciable,7 it is impossible for a court to hold a state actor in

3.
These noble efforts should be treated with high regard. The following
documents make up the principal scholarship on the subject. See, e.g., JOHN SCANLON
ET AL., WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT? (2004); Robert Adler, Freshwater:Sustaining Use
by Protecting Ecosystems, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10309 (2009); Joseph
Dellapenna, A Human Right to Water: An Ethical Position or a Realizable Goal?, in
RECONCILING HUMAN EXISTENCE WITH ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, 183 (Laura Westra et
al. eds., 2008); Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL'Y 487 (1999);
Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs.
331 (2005); Ling-Yee Huang, Not Just another Drop in the Human Rights Bucket: The
Legal Significance of a Codified Human Right to Water, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 353 (2008);
Benjamin W. Cramer, Note, The Human Right to Information, the Environment and
Information About the Environment: From the Universal Declaration to the Aarhus
Convention, 14 COMM. L. & POL'Y 73 (2009); Melina Williams, Note, Privatizationand
the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 469
(2007); see also Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die
Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under
InternationalLaw, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 82-83 (2002); Karen Kong, The Right to
Food: A Right-Based Approach to Hunger and Social Inequality, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 525, 536 (2009).
4.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights),
1, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); see also Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Centre [SERAC] v.
Nigeria,Afr. Comm'n Human & Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96, 56 (2001); Aoife
Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-State Actors
Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the 'Obligation
to Protect,' 9 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 225, 241 (2009) (discussing the SERAC decision).
5.
In JOOST PAUWELYN, OPTIMAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NAVIGATING BETWEEN EUROPEAN ABSOLUTISM AND AMERICAN VOLUNTARISM (2008),
Paulwelyn distinguishes between "rights" and "entitlements." Pauwelyn defines a right
as corresponding "to just one type of entitlement (namely those protected by a so-called
property rule), [noting that] the broader term entitlements was needed to avoid
confusion and to encapsulate not just one but all types of entitlements." Id. at 5-6 n.3;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
6.
ICESCR, supra note 5.
7.
See, for example, Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009 (8) SA 1 (SA) at 1 (S.
Afr.), where the court upheld the right of the poor plaintiffs-residents to water in the
Phiri Township in Johannesburg. The court found that Articles 11 and 12 of the
ICESCR absolutely recognize the right to an adequate standard of living and continued

704

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43:701

contempt due to its inability to provide potable water to its citizens,
and refusal by a state actor to provide water has rarely been
prosecuted.8 This is particularly true for the world's Least Developed
Countries (LDCs),9 which cannot afford to provide their citizens with
water. Moreover, national and international courts are powerless to
enforce the right against any dictator who does not wish to provide
his people with potable water and good sanitation.
A. The Dilemma with the Right
There are two fundamental problems with the "right." First, it is
unenforceable.' 0 Indeed, it is axiomatic that there can be no right
without a remedy." In addition, as Joseph Vining observed, "[t]hat

improvement, and the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health. Id. 17.
8.
See Amy Hardberger, Whose Job is it Anyway?: Governmental Obligations
Created by the Human Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 533, 563-65 (2006)
(suggesting the rarity of enforcement of water rights).
9.
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) include forty-nine of the poorest
and weakest counties in the world. U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing
States
[UN-OHRLLS],
Least
Developed
Countries-Country
Profiles,
http://www.unohrlls.orglen/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). For the criteria for
identifying LDCs, see UN-OHRILLS, The Criteria for the Identification of the LDCs,
2005, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2010).
In its latest triennial review of the list of LDCs in 2003, the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations used the following three criteria, as
proposed by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP), for the identification
of the LDCs:
*

*

*

a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the
gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion, above
$900 for graduation);
a human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite Human
Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c)
education; and (d) adult literacy; and
an economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic
Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) the instability of
agricultural production; (b) the instability of exports of goods and
services; (c) the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share
of manufacturing and modern services in GDP); (d) merchandise export
concentration; and (e) the handicap of economic smallness (as measured
through the population in logarithm); and the percentage of population
displaced by natural disasters.

Id.
10.
See Hardberger, supra note 8, at 563 (discussing the difficulty of enforcing
water rights).
11.
The Latin term for the doctrine is ubi jus ibi remedium. See generally,
United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 62 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365 (D. P.R. 1999) ("We begin with
a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, ubi jus ibi remedium-where there is a
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which evokes no sense of obligation is not law. It is only the
appearance of law."12 Thus, the putative right is of little help or
solace to those who have no access to potable water or to the millions
who die annually due to its unavailability.1 3
Second, the rights scholars do not address how the issue of
privatization of water utilities, especially the failure of corporate
privatization and the commodification of water, should fall within the
penumbra of the right.14 These issues have yet to be addressed,
leaving this area of the law unsettled and burdened by practical
pitfalls.
This Article proposes a legal and pragmatic solution to the
problem of potable water for the world's poor and unpacks the
contours of the human right to water. The solution is based on a
model of privatized access to water 15 grounded in a microfinancing
paradigm that is in turn founded upon a loan program that was part
of the New Deal's Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (REA).16 This
right there is a remedy. This axiomatic principle forms the bedrock of our system of
justice."); Justice Hugh O'Flaherty, Speech, Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium (Otherwise: "Put up
the Defendant!"), 45 Loy. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1999) ("[T]he remedial base of the common
law-the law of tort-protects only specified interests. Unless one could bring one's
complaint within the framework of an established category or cause of action, one had
no redress at law."); Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The FundamentalRight
to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636-37 (2004) ("Stated
simply: Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there's a right, there must be a remedy.");
Heather J. Hanna & Alan G. Harding, Comment, General Law Division: Ubi Jus Ibi
Remedium-For the Violation of Every Right, There Must Be a Remedy: The Supreme
Court's Refusal to Use the Bivens Remedy in Wilkie v. Robbins, 8 WYo. L. REV. 193,
193-94 (2008) ("It is well established that '[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever,
he receives an injury."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803)).
Accordingly, "[tihere must always be an accessible forum in which a complainant
has oyer and terminer for any" plea of wrongdoing; where such a venue is lacking or
nonexistent one can not make her plea. Principles of Constitutional Construction,
http://www.constitution.org/cons/prin-cons.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
12.
JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON's SLEEP 34 (1995).
13.
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2166 n.169 (2005).
14.
See, e.g., William Screiber, Realizing the Right to Water in International
Investment Law: An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Bit Obligations, 48 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 431 (2008) (failing to address the privatization of water utilities); Violeta Petrova,
Note, At the Frontiersof the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatizationand the Human
Right to Water, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577 (2006) (same).
15.
Although, to date, privatization efforts by multi-national water companies
have failed-principally because they have sought to gouge the poor-this proposal
takes another approach. On the issue of corporate privatization, see discussion infra
Part III.
16.
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-604, 49 Stat. 1363
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 901 (1936)). For a fuller discussion of the Rural
Electrification Act, see generally Melissa A. Jamison, Rural Electric Cooperatives: A
Model for Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty Over Their Natural Resources, 12
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model therefore sidesteps the rights-based scheme, resting upon a
more concrete foundation of measurable results (i.e., the number of
the world's 2.2 billion people who lack potable water that will obtain
access to water versus the number that will not).
Part II provides a background for the remedy by establishing the
magnitude of the problem created by a lack of clean potable water
and sanitation. As part of this discussion, the Article examines the
environmental burden of waterborne disease. Part III examines
multinational corporations' failed efforts at privatizing water systems
in the developing world. Part IV explores substitutes to privatization
by corporate entities and the World Bank, including various
communities' efforts to privatize water systems that they use daily
and partnerships between communities and water utilities. Part V
addresses the New Deal's Rural Electric Cooperatives and assesses
this model's potential use in resolving the current dearth of potable
water in the developing world.
Finally, Part VI outlines the
microcredit system and suggests how it can be implemented to meet
the goal of attaining potable water for the poor.

II. A WORLD

WANTING FOR CLEAN WATER

A. The Enormity of the Problem
"Safe drinking water, sanitation and good hygiene are
fundamental to health, survival, growth and development."1 7
Accordingly, the World Health Organization (WHO) recently observed
that "[s]afe drinking water and basic sanitation are so obviously
essential to health that they risk being taken for granted."' 8 Unless
people gain access to sources of drinking water that are clean, safe,
and reliable, "[e]fforts to prevent death from diarrhea or to reduce the
burden of such diseases as ascaris, dracunculiasis, hookworm,
schistosomiasis and trachoma are doomed to failure."' 9
The problem is so pervasive that former South African President
Thabo Mbeki recently asserted that "[w]e have a duty to fight against

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 401, 440-46 (2005); Richard P. Keck, Reevaluating the Rural

ElectrificationAdministration:A New Deal for the Taxpayer, 16 ENVTL. L. 39 (1985).
17.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] & U.N. CHILDREN'S FUND [UNICEF],
MEETING THE MDG DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION TARGET: THE URBAN AND RURAL
CHALLENGE OF THE DECADE 2 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/water_
sanitationhealth/monitoring/jmpfinal.pdf.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. For more about these diseases, see Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention

[CDC],

Parasitic

Diseases-Index

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/

of

Parasitic

Diseases,

(last visited Apr. 2, 2010); World Health

Organization [WHO], Trachoma, http://www.who.int/topics/trachomalen/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2010).
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domestic and global apartheid in terms of access to water."20 The
United Nations (UN) similarly declared that "[o]vercoming the crisis
in water and sanitation is one of the great human development
challenges of the early twenty-first century. [In addition, s]uccess in
addressing that challenge through a concerted national and
international response would act as a catalyst for progress in public
2
health."^
Unfortunately, the average person in the developing world will
not realize the universal availability of faucets or water piping at
home "in the short-or even medium term." 22 Such persons will be
bereft of safe water for the foreseeable future. 23 Of course, the
burdens of polluted water, lack of access to potable water, and basic
sanitation deficiencies fall on the poor. 24 They are not only much
"less likely to have access to safe water and sanitation, but .

.

. also

less likely to have the financial and human resources to manage the
impact of this deprivation."2 5
Additionally, the laws and policies of many states offer scant
protection for the vulnerable. 2 6 Even where laws providing state

20.
Thabo Mbeki, S. Afr. President, Address at the Launch of the U.N.
Development Programme 2006 Human Development Report (Nov. 9, 2006), available
at http://www.dfa.gov.zaldocs/speeches/2006/mbekl109.htm.
21.
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2006-BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS1

(2006) (emphasis added).
22.

WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], THE RIGHT TO WATER 15 (2003), available at

http://www.who.int/water_sanitation health/rightowater/en.
23.
See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme, Millennium
Development
Goals-Goal
7:
Ensure
Environmental
Sustainability,
http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal7.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) ("Target 7c: Reduce by
half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation") [hereinafter MDG Goal 7]; see also U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc.
AFFAIRS, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2007, at 7 (2007) (discussing the

progress towards halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose
income is less than one dollar a day).
24.
U.N. WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, THE UNITED NATIONS
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (2009) ("An

estimated 90% of the 3 billion people who are expected to be added to the population by
2050 will be in developing countries, many in regions where the current population
does not have sustainable access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation.").
25.
WHO, supra note 22, at 22.

26.

See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulatinga Human Right

to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 980 (2004) (noting that the costs of water resources in
South Africa are disproportionately distributed to the poor); Kirk Herbertson & David

Hunter, Sustainable Energy: Emerging Standards for Sustainable Finance of the
Energy Sector, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 4, 4 (2007) ("[M]any energy-related
projects have been scrutinized (and in some cases rejected) for their contributions to
severe environmental degradation, involuntary resettlement of poor and marginalized
communities, or the inequitable allocation of project benefits and costs."); Christine A.
Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1056
(2005) ("[M]arkets, if not carefully devised and regulated, may place an inequitable
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support for destitute persons do exist, they are seldom enforced. 27
The rural poor also have little or no access to the political process,2 8
and yet they comprise "[s]ome 80% of those who have no access to
improved sources of drinking water."29 In 2002, the WHO estimated
that more than 1.1 billion people worldwide lack clean drinking water
and that "2.6 billion people have no sanitation."3 0 The WHO also
estimates that at least 1.8 million people die annually from diarrheal
diseases, including cholera, with children below the age of five,
mostly in developing countries, constituting 1.6 million (or 90%) of
these deaths.3 1 This figure is five times the number of children who
die annually from HIVAIDS. 32 Of the deaths caused by diarrheal

burden upon the poor and people of color."); Maria Merritt, Bioethics, Philosophy, and
Global Health, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 273, 299 (2007) ("The distribution
of these burdens between affluent and poor populations is tremendously inequitable.").
27.
See Hardberger, supra note 8, at 563.
28.
See, e.g., James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, DialogicalGovernance: A
Mechanism of Constitutional Governance, 72 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 29, 46 (2009)
("groups in society [that] are typically shut out of the political process-the poor, the
powerless, racial minorities, accused criminals"); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes:

Combating the Politics of Power in EnvironmentalLaw, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1468-69
(2005) ("[T]he discrete-and-insular-minorities formulation, taken literally, leaves out
many of the groups that are in fact most powerless in the political process. The poor,
for example, are diffuse rather than insular. . . ."); David Cole, Book Review, The

Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism:Balancing Away Liberty after 9/11, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1735, 1744 (2007) ("Constitutional law, in other words, does not leave the question of
ethnic profiling to the political process, precisely because the political process has
historically done such a poor job of ensuring equity for members of racial minority
groups.").
29.
Likewise,
[t]he number of people without access to improved water sources in 2000 was a
staggering 1.1 billion globally. The number of urban dwellers without access to
these services reached 157 million, which represents an increase of 44 million
over the comparable figure in 1990. The situation with global sanitation is
much worse, with almost three times as many people denied even minimal
sanitation facilities.
WHO, supranote 22, at 21-22.
30.
Imogen Foulkes, Water Access Progress 'Too Slow,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 5,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilin depthl5317376.stm.
31.
See, e.g., World Health Organization [WHO], Diarrhoeal Diseases,
http://www.who.int/vaccineresearchldiseases/diarrhoeallen/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
Diarrhoeal diseases represent a major health problem in developing
countries.... Conservative estimates place the global death toll from
diarrhoeal diseases at about two million deaths per year (1.7-2.5 million
deaths), ranking third among all causes of infectious disease deaths worldwide.
Most of these deaths occur in children under five years of age.

Id.
32.

Lack of Clean Water Kills 2M Children a Year: UN Report, ABC NEWS, Nov.

10, 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200611/s1785310.htm.
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disease, 88% are fully ascribed to unsafe water and deficient
sanitation.33
It is for these reasons that the WHO declared in 2003 that
providing water to the peoples of the developing world was an urgent
priority. Similarly, the UN adopted the Millennium Development
Goals, 34 which seek to halve the number of people who do not have
access to water by 2015.35 Without any financial support, however,
these programs have done little. 36
Finally, the "[1]ack of basic sanitation indirectly inhibits the
learning abilities of millions of school-aged children who are infested
with intestinal worms transmitted through inadequate sanitation
facilities and poor hygiene."37 It also adds to a higher rate of wasteful
and unproductive time caused by adult illness and the need for
parents to stay home to take care of children.3 8 If the world's poor are
to climb out of their morass, the status quo must change. One option
for those who seek to aid those in need is privatization.
III. PRIVATIZATION, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND THE WORLD
BANK: AN UNEASY MARRIAGE

'Water privatizationin the developing world has been met
with public opposition and conflict, as opponents argue

World Health Organization [WHO], Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Links
33.
to Health-Facts and Figures Updated November 2004, http://www.who.int/
(last visited Apr. 2,
water-sanitation-health/publications/facts2004/en/index.html
2010). In fact, WHO Director-General Dr. Lee Jong-Wook stated:
Water and Sanitation is one of the primary drivers of public health. I often
refer to it as 'Health 101,' which means that once we can secure access to clean
water and to adequate sanitation facilities for all people, irrespective of the
difference in their living conditions, a huge battle against all kinds of diseases
will be won.

Id.
MDG Goal 7, supranote 23.
34.
Id.
35.
See, e.g., MICHAEL CLEMENS & TODD MOSS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE
36.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS? 2 (2005), available at http://www.cgdev.org/
files/3940_file WWMGD.pdf (indicating that the Millennium Development Goals have
not been achieved because of the need for more financial aid, but also asserting that
there are diminishing returns to financial aid).
37.
WHO & UNICEF, supranote 17, at 2.
UNICEF, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene-Links to Health Education and
38.
Development, http://www.unicef.org/washlindexhealthandeducation.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2010) ("Poor water and sanitation exact a heavy economic cost in terms of
health spending, loss of productivity and labour diversion.").
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that water is a human right and that global corporations
are exploiting the needs of the world's poor for profit. '
Privatization of water systems in developing countries has been
taking place for approximately a decade and a half.40 The reaction to
this phenomenon by the world's poor is, for the most part, uniformly
unfavorable. 4 1 A number of examples from around the world provide
insight into why this is the case.
A. Johannesburg,South Africa
In 1994, the World Bank required South Africa to privatize its
water system as a condition to lending money to the new Mandela
government. 4 2 Johannesburg turned over its water utilities to Suez
Lyonnaise des Eaux (Suez), the French water conglomerate. 43 As
soon as Suez received its concession, it began installing high tech
water meters. 44
This privatization backfired on the people of South Africa.
"Impoverished South Africans, unable to afford to feed the meters,
turned back to their little rivers of cholera for water, and the
government ha[d to] cut off water services to over ten million people
[following] the introduction of [these] new programs in 1996."45 The
shutoffs also occurred when the poor in townships outside of
Johannesburg, such as Orange, could likewise not afford to pay their
bills.46 Eventually, Suez's contract was terminated because the
water it was supplying was contaminated with diarrhea-causing
bacteria. 47

39.

Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States:

Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 785, 798 (2009).
40.
Amy K. Miller, Note, Blue Rush: Is

an International Privatization

Agreement a Viable Solution for Developing Countries in the Face of an Impending
World Water Crisis?, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 218 (2005).
41.
Arnold, supra note 39, at 798.
42.
See Maude Barlow, The World's Water: A Human Right or a Corporate
Good?, in WHOSE WATER IS IT? 25, 27 (Bernadette McDonald & Douglas Jehl eds.,
2003) (stating that the World Bank "influenced" South Africa to privatize many of its
water services).
43.
Id. at 27.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. (emphasis added).
46.
Id. at 26-27.
47.
Id.; European Commission Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, Opportunities for
Suez?, http://archive.corporateeurope.org/suezinafrica.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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B. Cochabamba,Bolivia
The story of Cochabamba, Bolivia, is quite similar. In 2000,
under World Bank pressure, the government of President Hugo
Banzer granted a forty-year franchise to a private consortium, Aguas
del Tunari (owned by San Francisco-based Bechtel), to manage the
municipal water system. 48 Four months into the concession, water
prices mushroomed by as much as 400%.49 The entire set up not only
forced workers to expend between 25% and 30% of their incomes to
pay Bechtel for water but also left 40% of Cochabamba's residents
unconnected to the municipal water system.5 0
As dissatisfaction grew with Bechtel, anti-privatization protests
and riots exploded across the country. 51 The police, sanctioned by the
federal government, fought with the protesters, causing hundreds of
injuries and the death of a teenager. 52 Following this extreme
response, and with over $20 million in damage to private and public
property, the government was forced to terminate the contract.5 3 In
response, Bechtel and its partners sued the Bolivian government for
breach of contract, demanding $25 million in damages.5 4 But in the
face of worldwide public condemnation, the consortium abandoned
the suit.55 Additionally, Bolivia's privatization disaster gave birth to
the Cochabamba Declaration, a nonbinding proclamation that states
in pertinent part that "[w]ater is a fundamental human right and a
public trust to be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it
should not be commodified, privatized or traded for commercial
purposes." 56

48.
On the Cochabamba water privatization saga, see generally James
Salzman, Thirst:A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 94, 95-96
(2006); Timothy O'Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatizationof Water and Its
Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 357, 360 (2006); Rachel Welch, Comment, And Not a Drop to
Drink: Water Privatization, Pseudo-Sovereignty, and the Female Burden, 15 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 313, 315-16 (2006). For Bechtel Corporation's version of the
incident, see Bechtel Perspective on the Aguas Del Tunari Water Concession in
Cochabamba, Bolivia, BECHTEL.COM, Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.bechtel.comlassets/
files/PDF/Cochabambafacts03O5.pdf.
49.
See O'Neill, supra note 48, at 367 (describing mushrooming water prices
shortly after the concession).
50.
Id. at 367-68; Salzman, supranote 48, at 94.
51.
O'Neill, supra note 48, at 368-69.
52.
Id. at 370.
53.
Id. at 361, 370-71.
54.
Id. at 371.
Welch, supra note 48, at 317.
55.
56.
Cochabamba Declaration, available at http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/
agp/free/imflboliviacochabamba.htm#declaration (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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C. Trade Liberalizationand Water Scarcity
Vandana Shiva, the well-known Indian physicist and
environmentalist, among many others, shares the sentiments of the
Cochabamba Declaration. Additionally, Dr. Shiva and her colleagues
and supporters assert that the World Bank's obligatory policies and
the World Trade Organization's rules on trade liberalization "are
creating a sweeping culture of corporate states all over the world."5 7
She also charges the World Bank with playing a major role in the
creation of water scarcity and with "transforming that scarcity into a
market opportunity for water corporations. "58
In fact, the Bank currently has outstanding commitments for
water projects in the billions of dollars. "From July 2008 to March
2009, 147 [of the Bank's] PPI [Private Participation in Infrastructure]
projects reached financial or contractual closure with investment
commitments ...

of US $55 billion in 46 developing countries."5 9

Many of the PPI projects are taking place in South Asia, particularly
in India, where World Bank mandated privatization is widespread. 60
In fact, South Asia receives 20% of the Bank's loans. 61 Nevertheless,
the Bank has been widely criticized for its water project policies,
many of which have damaged the environment and caused local
communities to suffer gravely. 62

57.

VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT 87

(2002).
The World Bank serves the interests of water companies both through its
regular loan programs to governments, which often come with conditions that
explicitly require the privatization of water provision, and through its private
sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, which invests in
privatization projects and makes loans to companies carrying them out.
Lending about $20 billion to water supply projects over the last decade, the
World Bank has been the principle financer of privatization. A year-long study
by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, a project of the
Washington-based Center for Public Integrity, released in February, 2003,
found that the majority of World Bank loans for water in the last five years have

required the conversion of public systems to private as a condition for the
transaction. The performance of these companies in Europe and the developing
world has been well documented: huge profits, higher prices for water, cut-offs
to customers who cannot pay, little transparency in their dealings, reduced
water quality, bribery, and corruption.
Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Water Privatization,GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM, Jan. 2004,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43398.html.
58.
SHIVA, supranote 57, at 87.
59.

WORLD BANK GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON NEW

PPI PROJECTS-UPDATE 3, at 2 (2009), http://ppi.worldbank.org/features/june2009/
200906PPIFinancialCrisisImpact.pdf.
60.
SHIVA, supranote 57, at 90-91.
61.
Id. at 87.
One example is a
62.
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New Delhi, India

The problems that India has experienced with World Bankfunded water projects are beyond the scope of this Article. However,
two examples are necessary to provide a working understanding of
the extent of the issue. The first is a Bank-funded project to provide
water service to the city of Delhi. Newspaper accounts report that
the project "seems drenched in a variety of questions. Lack of
transparency in the functioning of a leading multilateral
organization, favoritism for specific private sector firms, and
inadequate homework done by the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) are only a
few of the issues soaking the venture."63 Following a presentation by
Indian NGOs about the problems to the DJB's Chief Minister Sheila
Dixit, she expressed concern about the project's adverse impacts,
including a
steep rise in tariffs, water inaccessibility to the poor, no guarantee of
improvement in services or of constant water supply [and the fact that
Delhi's citizens] would also have to bear the brunt of [increased]
salaries of a total of about USD 25,000 per month which have been
recommended for the employees of the concerned water distribution
64
companies.

Additionally, Ms. Dixit told the NGOs that the project would be
placed on hold, there would be more transparency, and the project
would not progress without public participation. 65 Nevertheless, "a
contrary reality emerged. This caused the controversy. The DJB
seems to be simply implementing the 'orders' of the World Bank." 66

bank-funded water project in Pakistan [which] has led to widespread
environmental harm and suffering among local communities. The project has
contributed to deadly floods, and violates six of the Bank's binding policies.
These are the main conclusions of an investigation by the Inspection Panel, the
World Bank's independent investigative body.
Press Release, Int'l Rivers, Internal Investigation Shows World Bank Water Project
at
2006),
available
(Oct.
25,
in
Pakistan
Livelihoods
Destroys
http://internationalrivers.org/en/south-asialpakistan/internal-investigation-showsworld-bank-water-project-destroys-livelihoods-pakis.
63.
Varupi Jain, Delhi Water Project Soaked in Controversy, INDIA TOGETHER,
at
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/sep/govavailable
26,
2005,
Sept.
delwater.htm#continue. The Delhi Jal Board, the government agency responsible for
supplying potable water to the area surrounding and including Delhi, known as the
National Capital Territory, was formed via an Act of the Delhi Legislative Assembly on
April 6, 1998. See generally, Delhi Jal Board, Welcome to the Department of the Delhi
Jal Board, http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/DOITDJB/djb/home (last visited
Apr. 2, 2010).
Jain, supra note 63.
64.
Id.
65.
66.
Id.
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Tamil Nadu

The second example is the Irrigated Agriculture Modernization
and Water Bodies Restoration and Management (IAMWARM)
Project 67 in Tamil Nadu, a state in southern India. It bears witness
to India's enormous project expenditures and the concomitant
disillusionment in the outcome of these projects. It also demonstrates
how these water projects ultimately affect India's environment and
communal life. Located in the state's capital district, Pudukottai, the
project involves tank upgrading supported by a $556 million World
Bank loan. 68
Although IAMWARM was filled with great promise, the reality is
very different. The recently renovated tank bunds have developed
serious cracks and have even crumbled. 69 In response,
it was clear that there was a feeling of alienation from the project, and
anger among the farmer community as it directly affected their
livelihoods. "I am not able to sow this year as the work undertaken on
the bund and sluice gate has diverted water away from my farm," said
one farmer. 70

These two examples demonstrate the problems with corporate
privatization of water projects and World Bank funding. They also
point to one of the grave predicaments facing the world's poor in their
pursuit of potable water and proper sanitation: the commodification
of water. The Article next addresses that issue within the framework
of the privatization of water resources.
D. Whisper Sweet Dollars in My Ear
The World Bank estimates the value of potential water markets
at over $1 trillion. 7 ' Following the collapse of the technology equities
in 2000, Fortune Magazine recognized the water sector as an
exceptionally profitable industry for investors.72 The World Bank's

67.
See generally The World Bank, Tamil Nadu Irrigated Agriculture
Modernization and Water-Bodies Restoration and Management Project-India,
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P90768&theSitePK=40941
&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=228424&piPK=73230
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010)
(serving as a repository of vital project information).
68.
Bharti Patel, I Am Warm-World Bank in India, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG,
Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.countercurrents.org/patel21O109.htm.
69.
A bund is "an embankment used especially in India to control the flow of
water." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY (2010), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionarylbund.
70.
Patel, supra note 68.
71.
MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE GOLD: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE
COMMODIFICATION OF THE WORLD'S WATER SUPPLY 23 (2001).
72.
VANDANA
SHIVA,
WATER
WARS
87
(2002),
available at
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Vandana_Shiva/WaterWarsVShiva.html.
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requirement that states privatize their water delivery sectors in
exchange for the Bank's loans has guaranteed huge profits for private
sector companies like Suez and Bechtel.7 3 This prospective revenue
stream has apparently caused Monsanto, the former chemical giant
and now huge agrochemical company, to break into the water
business. 74 It recently proclaimed that because of the guaranteed
returns, its investment cost opportunities will be lower and it "will be
well positioned via these businesses to profit even more
significantly."75
The following example from the Philippines demonstrates the
potential harm of the World Bank's privatization program. In 1997,
the Philippine government, with backing from the World Bank and
private investors, privatized the municipal water supply of its capital,
Manila, in an effort to promote efficiency and improve service. 76 The
privatization of that city's municipal water system, despite its
promise, reduced
the public's access to quality water. After privatization, water became
less affordable. Although water rates initially declined and services
improved in the immediate aftermath of privatization, both
concessionaries requested 15% tariff increases from the regulatory body
within two years of the agreement. This was only the first of a series of
rate increases, which eventually left rates 500-700% higher nine years
after privatization. For most residents of the city, higher rates have
resulted in a substantial portion of their income going to water and
77
sewer service.

Critics assert that the history of corporate privatization of water
utilities is dismal, and one can see why from Manila's experience.
Additionally, once water and/or the system of distribution and
delivery are privatized, the costs for local consumers become

73.
See, e.g., Jennifer Naegele, What is Wrong With Full-Fledged Water
Privatization?, 6 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 99, 112 (2004) (discussing the annual
revenues of the three major players in corporate water privatization).

74.

Geoffrey Lean, GM Giant's Plan to Cash in on World Water Crisis,

INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 26, 1999, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/gm-giants-plan-to-cash-in-on-world-water-crisis-1121825.html.
75.
Id. Vandana Shiva, Director of the Research Foundation for Science,
Technology and Ecology, in New Delhi, India, quoted Monsanto officials as asserting,
"first, we believe that discontinuities (either major policy changes or major trendline
breaks in resource quality or quantity) are likely, particularly in the area of water and
we will be well-positioned via these businesses to profit even more significantly when
these discontinuities occur." Vandana Shiva, World Bank WTO, and Corporate Control
Over Water, INT'L SOCIALIST REV., Aug.-Sept. 2001.
76.
Sarah I. Hale, Comment, Water Privatizationin the Philippines:The Need
to Implement the Human Right to Water, 15 PAC. Rim L. & POLY J. 765, 768 (2006).
Privatization has also taken place in cities across the globe, including Buenos Aries,
Jakarta, and Nkobongo, South Africa. Id. at 766.
77.
Id. at 772 (citations omitted).
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prohibitive7 8 and distribution networks are not upgraded.7 9 A report
authored by the Asian Development Bank recently identified an
example of this phenomenon, finding that, as of 2004, only 58% of
Manila's population was connected to the city's water system.80
Moreover, the city's sewer service is poorly managed and in a ghastly
state of affairs.8 ' In fact, no improvements were made to the entire
distribution network during the privatized period. 82 In 2003, a World
Bank study reported that water and sewer access in Manila was
among the worst in the major Asian cities, second only to Jakarta.8 3
Nevertheless, water privatization continues unabated because
"[water] privatization is a big business; revenue from the global trade
in water amounts to more than US $800 billion annually." 84 Other
examples of profiteering by international corporations include World
Bank-driven privatization programs in Chile, where the Bank
imposed a loan condition to guarantee a 33% profit margin to the
French company Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux.85
Indeed, privatization has an even more pernicious side. It affects
not only "people's democratic right to water . . . [but also] .

.

. the

livelihoods and employment rights of those who work in
municipalities and local water and sanitation systems." 86 For
example, when the World Bank forced Ghana to privatize the water
system of its capital city, Accra, the system's 4,500 existing employees
were fired, and the private company brought in its own people.8 7

78.
See id. at 772-73 (discussing the extremely high cost of quality water).
79.
See id. at 772 (stating that the city's figures for water connectivity are still
below the United Nations' goals).
80.
ASIAN DEv. BANK, WATER IN ASIAN CITIES: UTILITIES' PERFORMANCE AND
CIVIL SOCIETY VIEWS 53 (Charles T. Andrews & Cesar E. Yfiiguez eds., 2004).
81.
Hale, supra note 76, at 772 (citing ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 80, at 52)
("In 2001, 93% of the city or 10 million residents lacked access to the sewer and waste
system.").
82.
See id. at 768 (stating there were "no meaningful improvements in service
and access" during the privatized period).
83.
Id. at 772-73.
84.
Id. at 766-67.
85.
BARLOW, supra note 71, at 29-30.
86.
SHIVA, supranote 57, at 91.

87.

See e.g., Rudolf Amenga-Etego, Water Privatization in Ghana: Still Born or

Born
Deformed?
(July
7,
2003),
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?
ID=2162&ThisURL-./western.asp&URLName=WESTERN+REGION.
The direct impact on the workers of the Ghana Water Company Limited
[GWCL] is no less traumatizing. Many have lost their jobs since the
privatization began in the mid '90s. Information filtering in from Bank sources
suggests that about 2900 workers will be laid off under the current
management service contract deal. Discussions over severance packages have
been ongoing for several years.

Id.; see also, Ghana Goes Ahead with Controversial Water Privatisation,AFROL NEWS,
Jan.

13,

2005, http://www.afrol.com/categories/economy-development/privatisation.
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As so often happens in the developing world, the employees 8 8
who were fired were members of Ghana's middle class and played a
significant role in the local economy. Once any severance pay they
may receive has been exhausted, many of the system's previous
employees, now turned out and jobless, will likely descend into
poverty and require government assistance to make ends meet. As a
consequence of the World Bank's loans, the Ghanaian government
was not only forced to pay private companies for managing Accra's
water system and delivering that water at an inflated price, but it
was also burdened with another obligation: supporting previously
employed individuals. Moreover,
the prospect of privatisation has [already] driven up consumer water
costs in Ghana. Recent IMF and World Bank loan conditions mandated
a 95 percent hike in water fees in May 2001 and additional price hikes
are planned. Although the minimum wage has just been raised to
5,000 cedis a day, this amount can hardly sustain the average family.
(One U.S. dollar exchanges for 7,000 cedis.)8 9

The poor in the developing world cannot absorb such significant
increases. It is why they rebel against mammoth rate escalations for

("Nearly half the 4,600 employees of Ghana Water are likely to lose their jobs as the
new private sector contractor seeks to streamline operations. However, there is
financial provision within the water privatisation project to compensate those made
redundant."); GWCL to Redeploy 1,280 Workers, GHANAWEB, Aug. 24, 2005,
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=88700
("About 1,280 workers of the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) to be retrenched
under the Private Sector Participation (PSP) in water delivery have started receiving
letters informing them of their redeployment, as the multi-million-dollar programme
finally gears up to take off.").
88.
See e.g., DAMERIA HASIBUAN, PRES. SP PDAM, JAKARTA WATER PRIVITIZATION:
WORKERS CAMPAIGN TO BRING BACK WATER IN PUBLIC HANDS (2007), available at
http://www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/6ADBWaterprivatisationJakartaDameria-kyoto-apr07 eng.pdf.
When first privatized in 1998, PDAM Jakarta (PAM JAYA) (a public water
utility owned by the city government) has [sic] approximately 3.000 employees.
Shortly after the privatization, 2800 of them were seconded to the private
concessionaires, Suez and Thameswater. Approximately 150 employees were
still working for PDAM to supervise the service provided by the private sector.
In general, the payment difference between seconded and direct worker is 2.5
to 5 times. A manager (seconded employee) receives USD 1.200 while direct
employees with the same level receive USD 2.700. At a staff level, a seconded
employee (who has been working for 10 years) receive USD 160 while a new
direct staff can receive USD 300).

Id.
89.
Rudolf Amenga-Etego, Coalition Fights World Bank, IMF Privatization
Scheme,
http://www.citizen.org/cmeplWater/cmepWater/reports/ghanalarticles.cfm?ID=
7740 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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water provisions. And it is also why corporate water companies are
routinely ousted from developing states.
IV.

EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES

A. The Case for Community Privatization
Corporate efforts at privatization of water systems have thus far
been a complete and utter failure. Nevertheless, many critics of
water utility privatization in Manila and elsewhere concede that, for
These
developing countries, private capital is required.9 0
investments are needed because municipal water systems in
developing countries lack the funds to extend piping and
connections.9 1 A middle ground must be sought. For example,
municipal water utilities might seek funding and operational
expertise from investors who are interested more in long-term, stable
opportunities and who do not expect returns greater than 5% to 6%
per annum. This type of investor differs from the large corporate
conglomerates that seek short-term, guaranteed high rates of return
(i.e., 20% to 30% per annum) and, therefore, steeply raise rates. The
Article next discusses this middle ground.
B. Surefootedness in a Middle Ground:Alternatives
to CorporatePrivatization92
Nature abhors a vacuum. Within the vacuum caused by the
failure of multinational corporations, a number of alternatives have
developed. Two options that have succeeded in supplying potable
water to the poor in Ghana and South Africa are addressed next.
Both have elements of community cooperation and are based on
small-scale or community-wide privatization approaches.
1.

Savelugu's Partnership

The Ghanaian alternative involves the creation of a rural
village's "public-community partnership." This entity was formed at

90.

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of privatization, see

generally MARK DUMOL, THE MANILA WATER CONCESSION: A KEY GOVERNMENT
OFFICIAL'S DIARY OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST WATER PRIVATIZATION 16-20 (2000)

(addressing the advantage of privatization with regards to financing, personnel, and
procurement); Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water

PrivatizationMissing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, 15
ENV'T & URBANIZATION 87 (2003).

91.
92.

Budds & McGranahan, supra note 90, at 97.
For a discussion on privatization, see generally id.; O'Neill, supra note 48.
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about the same time that the decision to privatize water in Accra was
made. As Accra's post-corporate privatization period ushered in the
doubling of water prices, the small town of Savelugu in northern
Ghana took a decidedly different route. The town's inhabitants
formed a "public-community partnership," where the community
collectively buys water from the Ghana Water Company, Ltd. and
takes responsibility for payment collections and minor repairs.93 The
community also enacted rules to protect its most vulnerable members
and set the price at which water is sold to its constituents. 94 This
partnership has reduced to 15% the quantity of water that is
unaccounted for through poor management, as compared with
Ghana's average of 50%.95
In addition, the community has a
collection and payment record of 100%, as compared to 60% in other
areas that the Ghana Water Company serves.96
2.

Cato Crest's Standpipes

Another successful community-based endeavor occurred in Cato
Crest, an informal settlement on the outskirts of Durban, South
Africa: 97
[lInstalling pipes for traditional, in-home water supply would have cost
too much, so a system of communal standpipes and private water tanks
was introduced instead. At the standpipes, everyone has access to
water and pays by the bucket, and there is also an option of installing
private ground tanks instead. Each month, the tank owner pays for
water in advance, and each day the tank is refilled. If the tank owner
cannot pay a full month in advance, his tank is not refilled, but he
98
always has access to the standpipes.

The Savelugu-Ghana Water Company Partnership and Cato
Crest's Standpipe systems treat water as a commons-not as a
corporate commodity. The commons approach to water "ownership"
fits the idea that access to potable water should be a human right.
Both examples also possess elements of this Article's proposal.

93.
Patrick Apoya, Community Public Sector Partnershipfor the Provision of
Water Services in Savelugu, Ghana 5-6 (Commonwealth Foundation, 2003), available
at http://www.commonwealthfoundation.com/uploads/documents/ACFbo5KjI.pdf.
94.
Id. at 5, 18.
95.
Id. at 14.
96.
Id. at 1.
97.
INTEGRATED REG'L INFO. NETWORKS [IRIN], RUNNING DRY: THE
HUMANITARIAN

IMPACT OF

THE

GLOBAL WATER

CRISIS 19

(2006),

http://www.irinnews.org/pdflin-depthlRunning-Dry-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf.
Id.
98.

available at
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V. A PROVEN MODEL FOR SUCCESS: THE NEW DEAL'S
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

This Article's proposed model has its historical roots in President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. During that era, rural
communities lacked electricity because for-profit electric companies
were convinced that running power lines to these potential customers
was unprofitable.99 By the 1930s, almost 90% of urban inhabitants
had electricity.' 0 0
However, only 10% of rural dwellers were as fortunate. 0 1 Why
did such a lopsided system exist? For the same reason that the poor
in today's developing world do not have water: there was a market
failure in the provision of electric power. "Private utility companies,
who supplied electric power to most of the nation's consumers, argued
that it was too expensive to string electric power lines to isolated
rural farmsteads" and that, in any case, most farmers "were too poor
to afford electricity."102
The lack of available electricity in rural areas meant that their
economies were exclusively and utterly dependent on agriculture. 0 3
Consequently, manufacturing and other businesses unrelated to
farming favored urban locations where electricity was available and
easily acquired.104 For many years, power companies continued to
disregard the rural areas of the nation-except where conditions
5
assured easy and early profit.' 0
President Roosevelt, however, felt that electricity was a basic
necessity that had to be provided to everyone. Hence, as part the
New Deal, he established a new agency, the Rural Electrification

George Sibley, Government Capitalism Can Be a Very Good Thing, HIGH
99.
COUNTRY NEWS, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.hcn.org/wotr/government-

capitalism-can-be-a-very-good-thing.
100.

See, e.g., id.

In 1939, residents of the towns of Gunnison and Crested Butte [Colorado] had
already had electricity in heir homes for almost half a century. This was true
for the nation at large, where virtually every city and town of any size had
electricity.... But only one rancher or farmer in nine had electricity.

Id.
101.

Id.

TVA: Electricity for All, Rural Electrification, http://newdeal.feri.org/
102.
tvaltva10.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Electricity for All].
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association [NRECA], History of
103.
Electric Co-ops, http://www.nreca.org/AboutUs/Co-opl01/CoopHistory.htm (last visited

Apr. 2, 2010).
104.

Id.

105.

Id.
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Administration (REA).
The REA's mandate was to
independently formed electric cooperatives in rural America. 10 6

fund

A. The Rural ElectrificationAdministration: The Early Years
Realizing that the privately owned power sector would not
connect farmers to electricity, the federal government took it upon
itself to solve the lack of electricity in rural America. Given the depth
of the problem and his keen eye towards practical solutions,
President Roosevelt proclaimed that "[e]lectricity is a modern
necessity . . . and ought to be found in every ...

part of the United

Therefore, one of the Roosevelt Administration's
States."10 7
inaugural acts in its efforts to supply electric power to America's
rural inhabitants was the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933
The Act authorized the TVA Board to construct
(TVAA).' 0
transmission lines to serve "farms and small villages that are not
otherwise supplied with electricity at reasonable rates." 0 9

B. The Failureof the Market and Government Intervention
The Roosevelt Administration understood that if private utilities
would not or could not supply electricity to the rural population,
government would have to assume that duty. Hence, in 1933,
President Roosevelt, with congressional assent, incorporated rural
electrification into the Public Works Administration (PWA).110 The

106.
See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. [USDA], Welcome to Rural Development's
Electric Programs, http://www.usda.gov/rus/electric (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
Providing reliable, affordable electricity is essential to the economic well-being
and quality of life for all of the nation's rural residents. The Electric Programs
provide leadership and capital to upgrade, expand, maintain, and replace
America's vast rural electric infrastructure. Under the authority of the Rural
Electrification Act of 1936, the Electric Programs make direct loans and loan
guarantees to electric utilities to serve customers in rural areas.

Id.
Sibley, supra note 99 (quoting Franklin Roosevelt).
107.
108.
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006)); see also id. § 831a(g)(1)(L) ("[The
Board shall] establish the electricity rates charged by the Corporation . . . "); id. § 831i
("[a]nd in the sale of such current by the Board it shall give preference to States,
counties, municipalities, and cooperative organizations of citizens or farmers, not
organized or doing business for profit, but primarily for the purpose of supplying
electricity to its own citizens or members").
Id. § 831i. "[T]here is hereby created a body corporate by the name of the
109.
'Tennessee Valley Authority' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'). The Board of
Directors first appointed shall be deemed the incorporator. . . ." Id. § 831.
110.
The Public Works Administration was created by the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 201(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933). "NIRA
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PWA was a part of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which was superseded in 1936 by the REA.1 1 '
As the REA grew, one of its first acts was the initiation, in 1937,
of a lending program.1 1 2 In essence, the government recognized that
private utility companies would not bring electricity to rural areas
and thus passed the Act to bring electricity to those areas, such as the
Tennessee Valley, and it launched the lending program to make
funds available to rural residents who were not connected to the grid.
In a 1935 article addressing the loan program entitled "Electrifying
the Countryside," Morris Cooke, the head of the REA, observed that
[i]n addition to paying for the energy he used, the farmer was expected
to advance to the power company most or all of the costs of
construction. Since the utility company ideas as to what constituted
sound rural lines have been rather fancy, such costs were prohibitive
for most farmers. 1 1 3

REA's loans were thus aimed at remedying the financial onus
required by private utilities before they would electrify rural areas.
"Even as late as July 1935, a group of utility company executives
wrote a report in which they claimed that, in light of their earlier
extensive research work, 'there are very few farms requiring
electricity for major farm operations that are not now served."' 4
That statement ultimately would come to haunt the for-profit electric
industry when the REA and the rural electric cooperatives, of which
there are more than 900 today, confirmed the falsity of the view that
most farms requiring electricity were being served." 5
Rural
electrification was rooted in the conviction that an affordable supply
of electricity would improve the standard of living and the economic
viability of the farm. Indeed, by 1939, the REA funded and helped

authorized the President to create the Public Works Administration and provided $3.3
billion in initial funding." Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New
Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 554 (2003).
111.
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down NIRA as unconstitutional in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, on May 11, 1935. 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
President Roosevelt established the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) via
Executive Order 7037 on the same day. Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935). REA's
duties and functions were "[t]o initiate, formulate, administer, and supervise a
program of approved projects with respect to the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy in rural areas." Id.
112.
See Research on the Economic Impact of Cooperatives, Rural Electric,
http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edulelectric (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (discussing the Electric
Cooperative Corporation Act, drafted in 1937 as "a model state law for formation and
operation of rural electric cooperatives," designed to help with the purchase of electric
power).
113.
Morris L. Cooke, Electrifying the Countryside, SURVEY GRAPHIC, 1935,
available at http://explorepahistory.comlodocument.php?docId=493.
Wake Electric, History, http://www.wemc.com/history.aspx (last visited
114.
Apr. 2, 2010).
115.
Id.
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"establish 417 rural electric cooperatives, which served over 288,000
households."11 6
Hence, the number of rural households with
electricity increased to 25%, from 10% in 1933.117

C. The Stimulation of Supply and Demand
As the number of rural households with electricity increased, an
interesting phenomenon took place: these farmers required more
energy than city dwellers."18 Moreover, when rural residents finally
managed to get connected to the power grid, they also began
purchasing refrigerators, stoves, and other electric appliances. 1 9
These sales helped spur local economies by increasing business for
local merchants.1 20 The demand for more electricity also served to
defray some of the added costs of stringing power lines across the
countryside.' 2 '
Furthermore, to help support this thriving segment of the local
economy, the TVA established the Electric Home and Farm Authority
(EHFA).1 22 The EHFA's mission was to extend low interest credit to
farmers for the purpose of purchasing major electric appliances like
electric ranges, refrigerators, and water heaters at reasonable
prices.123 Thus, the EHFA catalyzed an increase in the manufacture

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Electricity for All, supra note 102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122. The Electric Home and Farm Authority [EHFA], a retail sales finance
company owned and operated by the United States government, was
organized in 1934 in accordance with an Executive Order of the President
of the United States 'for the purpose of promoting and financing the sale
of electric appliances.' Initially a coordinate agency with the Tennessee
Valley Authority, it was designed to aid in 'developing and fostering an
increased use of electric power through the double reduction of cost of
electricity to the consumer and the cost of electrical appliances.'
Joseph D. Coppock, Organization and Operations of the Electric Home and Farm
Authority, in Government AGENCIES OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT [sic] CREDIT 91, 93
(Joseph D. Coppock ed., 1940) (quoting Exec. Order No. 6513 (Dec. 19, 1933)). On
August 1, 1935 the EHFA's jurisdiction was extended beyond the Tennessee Valley
region to the entire country. Id. at 93-94.
123.
See, e.g., Gregory B. Field, "Electricityfor All:" The Electric Home and Farm
Authority and the Politics of Mass Consumption, 1932-1935, 64 Bus. HIST. REV. 32, 33
(1990).
Using the TVA's mandate for the distribution of inexpensive electric power and
experimenting with new methods of state intervention in the economy,
Lilienthal crated the Electric Home and Farm Authority (EHFA), a federal
credit agency designed to subsidize and stimulate consumer purchases of
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and distribution of major appliances. 124 Indeed, the program was so
successful that these appliances were sold at local electric
cooperatives and local power companies.12 5
Over the next few decades, the number of rural cooperatives
doubled and the number of consumers tripled. 2 6 Consequently, the
number of rural consumers who were connected to and served by the
rural electric system grew at an exponential rate. By 1953, over 90%
of the farms across the United States were connected.1 27 Today, that
number has increased to above 99%.128 After almost sixty years of

lighting up rural America, the REA was abolished in 1994 in a
dramatic overhaul of the Department of Agriculture that created the
Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to fill the gap that the REA's
elimination left.129 Nevertheless, "[t]he electric loan programs [and
the cooperatives] continue to operate, much as they did under
REA."130
One other key fact about Morris Cooke and the REA is critical to
this history. The REA diverged from every other New Deal program
"in that it did not involve much federal spending beyond the wages of
its staff. Instead it was a loan program, a sort of 'government
capitalism.' The REA extended low-interest loans and staff experts to
cooperatives created by rural people who wanted electricity."113 And
even after the disappearance of the background framework,
cooperatives all across the nation are still producing electricity.' 3 2 In
addition, since its inception some seventy-five years ago, the default
rate on any of the funds that the federal government loaned to these

cooperatives has been negligible (less than 1%).133

electric appliances, primarily refrigerators, ranges, and hot water heaters. For
the ambitious young director, the EHFA involved much more than selling a few
iceboxes in the steamy Southeast. By increasing sales of refrigerators and other
goods through the EHFA, Lilienthal sought to forge a political economy of mass
consumption ....

Id.
124.
Id. at 36.
125.
Electricity for All, supra note 102.
126.
NRECA, supra note 103.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
See 7 U.S.C.S. § 6942 (LexisNexis 2010) (establishing the Rural Utilities
Service).
130.
NRECA, supra note 103.
131.
Sibley, supra note 99.
132.
See National Rural Electric Cooperative Association [NRECA], Co-ops by
the Numbers, http://www.nreca.org/AboutUs/Co-op101/CooperativeFacts.htm
(last
visited Apr. 23, 2010) ("[E]lectric cooperatives ... deliver 10 percent of the total
kilowatt hours sold in the U.S. each year").

133. See e.g., Laurence J. Malone, Rural Electrification Administration: Market
Failure in Delivering Electricity to Rural Areas Before 1930, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA,
Mar.
16,
2008,
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/malone.electrification.
administration.rural (citing D.C. BROwN, ELECTRICITY FOR RuRAL AMERICA 80 (1980)
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VI. APPLICATION TO WATER
The history of the REA demonstrates that destitute individuals
can be helped out of their dire situations where assistance is
provided. This means, however, that financial and expert resources
must be within their reach. That is the current dilemma facing those
without water. There are no available sources of capital to build the
needed water infrastructure for the estimated 1.1 billion people
worldwide that lack clean drinking water.13 4
Furthermore, given how they are currently organized, neither
the UN nor the numerous NGOs have the capital to fund construction
of entire systems in the thousands of villages across the world that
Moreover, the LDCs and many other
require potable water. 35
underdeveloped countries do not have the funds themselves, or else
many of them would have already provided utility services to their
residents.1 36 Similarly, international organizations such as the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) have not focused their financial
resources on the problem of the poor's lack of access to water and
would be required to redirect funds from their current programs in
order to attempt even a small-scale test project.' 3 7 Otherwise, it is

("Monies lent through the R.E.A. were also largely repaid, as the default rate was less
than one percent.")). But cf., Joel A. Youngblood, Note, Alive and Well: The Rural
Electrification Act Preempts State Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South
Louisiana Electric Cooperative Assoc., 16 ENERGY L.J. 489, 490 (1995) (citing
"increasingly-frequent loan defaults by cooperative borrowers."); id. n.7 (citing REA
Asks TVA to Help Stranded Co-ops and Consider Purchase of Big Rivers, ELEC. UTIL.
WK., Aug. 1, 1994, at 8; Illinois Co-op to Pay Off $ 28 Million REA Debt at 50 Cents to
the Dollar, ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 23, 1994, at 15; N.H. Electric Co-op Emerges From
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3; NRECA to Oppose
DistributionCo-op Guaranteesof REA Loans to G&Ts, ELEC. UTLL. WK., Mar. 5, 1990,

at 7).
134.
Ashok J. Gadgill & Elisabeth A. Derby, Providing Safe Drinking Water to
1.1 Billion Unserved People 2, 8-9 (96th Annual Air & Waste Mgmt. Assoc. Conference,
Working Paper No. 70492, 2003).
135.
Id. at 2, 8, 12.
136.
For a review of LDCs, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See e. g., United Nations Development Programme, Energy and
137.
Environment, UNDP FastFacts, Clean Water and Sanitation for the Poor (Jan. 3, 2003)
http://www.undp.org/water/wwf3/docs/factsheetl20303E.pdf.
Over the past decade, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
has managed a US$900 million budget devoted to sustainable water
development in 90 countries worldwide. The organization's presence in the
field of water resource management ranges from the international to the
community level ... UNDP offers several different types of service, including:
helping countries ensure that integrated water resource management is part
of their national development strategies; supporting efforts to make local use
and governance of water resources more effective and sustainable; building
capacity for cooperative management of transboundary waters; incorporating
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fair to assume that they would have spent the money (no more than
$200-$1,000) to drill a well and lay stand pipes.' 38
Likewise, national aid programs, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), also appear to be
uninterested in providing potable water to the forty-three nations it
assists in Sub-Saharan Africa. 3 9
A. Raising the Capital to Drill Water Wells
Private sources of capital must be mobilized to provide loan
programs similar to the REA's if potable water is to be provided to the
world's poor. One vigorous and successful method of marshalling
private-sourced capital that can be used to fund this type of project is

attention to gender at all levels of water governance; and Cap-Net, an
international network offering information- sharing and training to build
effective water resource management capacity.
Id. (emphasis added). It is of note that the UNDP budgeted $90 million per annum for
90 countries-$1 million per country-a tragically paltry sum. However, even this
meager amount was dedicated to studies of "integrated water resource management";
"building capacity for cooperative management"; "informationsharing"but not a penny
for providing water to the poor. See also, Press Release, High-Level Event on Water:
Interactive Dialogue (AM & PM) Sustainable Management of Water Resources Vital to
Achieving Anti-Poverty Goals, U.N. Doc. GA/10925 (Mar. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gal0925.doc.htm.
African Heads of State and Government had shown a great political
commitment to improving the water and sanitation sectors, notably at the 2009
Second African Water Week, held in Johannesburg, where Africa's water
challenges were broadly recognized as central to the continent's development
agenda. However, 340 million Africans still lacked access to safe water, and
580 million lacked access to basic sanitation. Seven of every ten rural people
had no access to a toilet, while 884 million people worldwide used unimproved
water sources. In 2006, more than 37 per cent of global population had no
access to toilets, latrines or other improved forms of sanitation.
Id. (emphasis added). While the press release mentions "great political commitment," it
gives no indication of a financial commitment.
138.
In the United States, the estimated cost of drilling a properly functioning
well is twelve dollars per foot. See How Much Does It Cost To Drill A Water Well?, FUN
TIMES GUIDE To HOME BUILDING, June 4, 2007, http://homebuilding.thefuntimes
guide.com/2007/06/howmuch cost drillwater well.php. (noting that "cost may be
more, or less [than twelve dollars per foot] dependent upon many factors"). "In
countries where the average annual income is several hundred dollars a year, a well or
washroom project costing $2,250 is far beyond the reach of most people in need."
Lifewater, Donors Help the Rural Poor Afford Projects, http://www.lifewater.ca/about/
solution6.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
139.
Cf. USAID, USAID Initiatives in Africa, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
sub-saharanafricalinitiatives/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2010) (highlighting the following
five programs: the Africa Education Initiative; the African Global Competitiveness
Initiative; the Anti-Corruption Initiative; the Congo Basin Forest Partnership; and the
Initiative to End Hunger in Africa).

A GLOBAL WATER APARTHEID

2010]1

727

the use of microloans.1 40 This kind of capital generation has already
established itself as an exceptionally robust means of pulling the poor
out of poverty. 14 1 Indeed, Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus
and his Grameen Bank won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for
pioneering a new type of banking: microcredit. 4 2 Professor Yunus
defines microcredit, or Grameencredit, as follows:
a)

It promotes credit as a human right.

b)
Its mission is to help the poor families to help themselves to
overcome poverty. It is targeted to the poor, particularly poor women.
c)
[The miost distinctive feature of Grameencredit is that it is not
based on any collateral, or legally enforceable contracts. It is based on
"trust", not on legal procedures and system[s].
d)
It is offered for creating self-employment for income-generating
activities and housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption.
It was initiated as a challenge to the conventional banking which
e)
rejected the poor by classifying them to be "not creditworthy". As a
result it rejected the basic methodology of the conventional banking and
143
created its own methodology.

Grameencredit's elements have allowed Yunus and GrameenBank to
"provide] over $2.5 billion in micro-loans" to 7.5 million
Bangladeshis, with an average loan of approximately $150 and a
repayment rate of 98%, which is on par with the repayment rate for
REA loans.144 The Grameen Bank Project (Grameen means "rural" or

140.
Cf. Kate Murphy, Lending Talent, and Money, on a Micro Scale, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2009, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20091
06/25/business/smallbusiness/25sbiz.html (discussing growing interest, as a result of
the availability of microloans, of programs teaching poor individuals how to start their
own businesses).
141.
See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Insource the Shareholding of Outsourced
Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 357, 417 n.177 (2008)
("On the benefit side, finance amounts to opportunity in the quite literal sense that it
enables people through the exercise of diligence to 'make real' their potentially valueadding ideas. In effect, this is precisely what micro-loans, small business loans,
corporate finance and venture capital finance all amount to."); Lisa R. Pruitt,
Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW for Rural Women, 30 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 707, 741 (2009) ("Women's federations [in China] 'coordinate with pertinent
sectors to provide on-the-job training' and they participate in disbursing micro-loans
to rural women.") (footnote omitted).
Molly Moore, Mirco-Credit Pioneer Wins Peace Price, WASH. PoST, Oct. 14,
142.
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/13/
AR200610130021 1.html.
143.
Grameen Bank, What is Microcredit, http://www.grameen-info.org/
index.php?option=com.content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108 (last visited Apr. 2,
2010).
144.
Devon Roepcke, Comment, "Should I Stay or Should I Go?" Preventing

Illegal Immigration by Creating Opportunity in Mexico Through Microcredit Lending,
38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 455, 459 n.26 (2008); Muhammad Yunus, How Legal Steps Can
Help to Pave the Way to Ending Poverty, ABA Hum. RTS., Winter 2008, at 22, available
at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winterO8/yunus-winterO8.html.
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"village" in the Bangla language) was developed with numerous
objectives, including the following:
-to offer a formal banking system to poor Bangladeshi men and women;
-to eradicate local money lenders' manipulation of poor villagers; and
-to create an opportunity
unemployed rural poor. 145

for self-employment

for

Bangladesh's

The bulk (97%) of the microloans have been extended to women or to
women's enterprises. 146
B. The Inner-Workings of the Microcredit System
Grameen Bank's loan process is an uncomplicated, no collateral,
trust-based financial agreement. 14 7 It involves no legal documentsprimarily because most of Grameen's borrowers are illiterate. 14 8
Consequently, the bank employs and relies upon "positive incentives
of continued access to credit and other support to ensure
repayments." 149 In fact, Grameen has yet to use either lawyers or the
courts to force its borrowers to repay their loans. 5 0
When a likely borrower seeks a loan, she is required to establish
a unit of five other borrowers from her neighborhood-or to join such
a group of borrowers-and agree to meet with these other women on
a weekly basis.15 The theory behind this grouping is quite novel.
First, each member of the group must repay her individual loan
before any other group member can apply for a subsequent loan. 152
Second, the women must work together to ensure that each of their
enterprises is successful enough so that each woman repays her
individual loans while also pressuring each other to remain
sufficiently profitable to repay their loans.
145.
Grameen Bank, A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114
(last visited
Apr. 2, 2010). The Bank's other objectives are to
bring the disadvantaged, mostly the women from the poorest households,
within the fold of an organizational format which they can understand and
manage by themselves; and reverse the age-old vicious circle of "low income,
low saving [and] low investment", into [sic] virtuous circle of low income,
injection of credit, investment, more income, more savings, more investment,
more income.

Id.
146.
Grameen Bank, Is Greenman Bank Different From Conventional Banks?,
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=27&
Itemid=176 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
147.
Yunus, supra note 144, at 22.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
Id.
152.
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"Grameen's borrowers are also required to maintain a regular
savings" account with the bank. 5 3 Indeed, both the bank's borrowers
and their "nonborrowing neighbors as a group have $150 in savings
for every $100 in loans outstanding."154 Grameen's current funds are
thus composed of its poor customers' savings.155
And most
importantly, the bank has been profitable for twenty-two years of its
twenty-five year history,'5 6 demonstrating how successful the
microcredit concept is. The next subpart addresses the issue of how
to apply the microcredit system to the problem at hand.
C. Convergence
Grameen's success with very small amounts of money
demonstrates that, for North Americans or Europeans, the amount of
seed money is trivial. Loaning $100 to a villager under the conditions
discussed above is almost no gamble at all. It amounts to twentyseven cents per day over the period of one year. Matches between
donor and donee can be made over the internet or via a nonprofit.
"The benefactors, in many cases, are ordinary individuals inspired by
a movement that is reshaping philanthropy and making it as
accessible as the click of a mouse or a visit to a house party." 5 7
For example, a recent newspaper article noted that "[a] Peruvian
widow borrowed $64 and bought a few pigs. For $55, a villager in
Ghana went into the mineral-water trade. A mother of nine in
Guatemala upgraded her grocery store with $250."158 Microcredit
organizations such as NamasteDirect, 5 9 Kiva.org,160 and Microcredit
Summit Campaign'61 have raised millions of dollars from hundreds of
thousands of individual lenders.1 62

153.
Yunus, supranote 144, at 22.
Id.
154.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
Patricia Yollin, MicrocreditMovement Tackling Poverty One Tiny Loan at a
157.
Time, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f-/cla/2007/09/30/MN7QRSUKA.DTL.
Id.
158.
159.
NamasteDirect, http://www.namaste-direct.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
160.
Kiva, http://www.kiva.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
161.
Microcredit Summit Campaign, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2010). The three microcredit organizations named are by no means
endorsed herein.
162.
Kiva, for example, has risen almost $130 million from nearly 700,000
investors since 2005. Kiva, Facts & History, http://www.kiva.org/about/facts (last
visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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D. Deploying Experts
Once sources of capital have been located, the next step is to tap
the well drilling community. A corps of retired and volunteer well
drillers can be assembled to teach members of a particular region how
to drill wells. This learned local cadre would then fan out to other
villages to impart their knowledge of boring wells.
The incentive for the various tribes and other groups to work
together would be that the initial group could not have wells drilled
in its village until it taught and helped at least one village or group to
drill wells. This requirement would then be imposed on each
subsequent group. This motivational tool is akin to Grameen Bank's
requirements that each borrower not borrow until she gathers or joins
a group of five and that no further loans be granted until every
member of the group has repaid her loan.
This Article envisions that this system would be introduced in
every LDC and soon become self-sustaining. Repayment of the loans
would take place once each village had a standpipe that would
provide potable water to the village. At that point, the women and
children in each village who do the back-breaking work of fetching
water would have more time to devote to either starting or expanding
businesses and going to school. The men would be required to
contribute. Additionally, since waterborne diseases would decrease
dramatically as a consequence of the new supply of potable water,
illnesses would also diminish significantly, thereby making the
population healthier and more productive.16 3
Since each village already has a governance structure (e.g., a
chief or other executive leader and possibly a governing council), this
structure can be employed to gather the repayment funds and decide
what type(s) of businesses would best suit the village's members.1 64
Thus, the existing institutional link between the individuals in each

163.
UNICEF,
Water,
Sanitation
and
http://www.unicef.org/wash/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).

Hygiene,

Children-and particularly girls-are denied their right to education
because their schools lack private and decent sanitation facilities. Women are
forced to spend large parts of their day fetching water. Poor farmers and wage
earners are less productive due to illness, health systems are overwhelmed and
national economies suffer.

164.

See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, in

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1, 2
(Oran R. Young ed., 1997) ("Dealing with environmental concerns has also brought to
our attention the need to think more systematically about institutional linkages and
about the ways in which individual regimes are embedded in larger institutional
structures and impinge on one another in international society.").
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village and those embedded among disparate villages would drive the
institutional structure for repayment and business development.
As each village begins to develop, it can then branch out to
provide proper sanitation and educational opportunities for children,
since children would not need to stay home to help with retrieving
water and watering gardens. Additionally, village councils would be
able to provide other amenities to villagers, just as rural farmers in
the New Deal era were able to purchase appliances.

VII. CONCLUSION

If legal tools are to benefit the world's poor and disenfranchised,
they cannot be void due to a perceived impossibility of
implementation. This is the problem with the purported human right
to water. It is quixotic. International lawyers thus must ferret out
the means to provide those who have little or no access to potable
water and proper sanitation with a suite of meaningful and workable
legal options. If they do not, then paper tigers will continue to fill law
reviews without ameliorating the problem.
The tools proposed here, including the use of microcredit loans
and the implementation of a mechanism such as REA's loan program,
will aid the 2.2 billion people in the world who lack potable water and
proper sanitation. Both of these approaches have been tested across
several decades, and they have proven capable of solving the
problems facing the disenfranchised persons of the world.

4

